

## Message Text

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ACTION EUR-12

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SAJ-01 SS-15 NSC-05 AEC-05 /065 W

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8810

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS 4676

CINCLANT

CINCUSAFE

CINCUSAREUR

CINCUSNAVEUR

USCINCEUR

USLOSACLANT

USNMR SHAPE

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 6375

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MPOL, NATO

SUBJECT: KEY ELEMENTS OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE: INDIVIDUAL DISCUSSIONS WITH ALLIED DRC REPRESENTATIVES

REF: USNATO 6289

BEGIN SUMMARY: ON NOVEMBER 13 US DEPUTY DEFENSE ADVISOR (BGEN BOWMAN) MET SEPARATELY WITH DRC REPS OF SIX ALLIES (DENMARK, TURKEY, NETHERLANDS, ITALY, CANADA, AND NORWAY) TO DISCUSS AND EXPAND ON NEW US TEXTS ON KEY ELEMENTS OF MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE. THESE ALLIES ALL EXPRESSED SUPPORT FOR US POSITIONS ON KEY ELEMENTS AND OBJECTED TO ONE OR MORE ASPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL STAFF DRAFT ON GROUNDS OF SHORT WARNING, FAST ESCALATION SCENARIOS, AND INADEQUATE EMPHASIS ON REINFORCEMENT FORCES. END SUMMARY.

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1. US DEPDEFADV (BGEN BOWMAN) VISITED DRC REPS OF SIX ALLIED NATIONS (DENMARK, TURKEY, NETHERLANDS, ITALY, CANADA AND NORWAY) NOVEMBER 13 AND MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

A. US CONSIDERS KEY ELEMENT ENTITLED "RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESOURCES AND STRATEGY" (REFTEL) AS HEART OF THE MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE EXERCISE AND THE MOST IMPORTANT KEY ELEMENT. AS A RESULT OF ONGOING MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE DISCUSSIONS, US HAS ACCOMMODATED ALLIES' VIEWS BY INCREASING THE STRESS ON THE MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE AMONG THREE LEGS OF THE TRIAD. BUT IN AGE OF STRATEGIC PARITY, CONVENTIONAL FORCE IMPROVEMENTS REQUIRE INCREASED EMPHASIS TO MAINTAIN TOTAL DETERRENT CREDIBILITY. US IS CONVINCED THAT IF NATO NATIONS ADHERE TO PRIORITIES AND COOPERATE MORE FULLY, THEY CAN INDEED ATTAIN AND MAINTAIN "A CONVINCING CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY TO BLOCK A CONVENTIONAL ATTACK."

B. WITH RESPECT TO US PAPER ON DURATION OF WAR, US FEELS STRONGLY THAT NATO SHOULD NOT BE FORCED TO RESORT TO NUCLEAR WAR FOR LACK OF STOCKS IF IT IS WINNING THE CONVENTIONAL BATTLE.

C. REGARDING IS DRAFT ON WARNING OF WAR, US BELIEVES THAT SCENARIO INVOLVING FULL WARSAW PACT PREPARATION IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE IS DRAFT ALLOWS. IS EMPHASIZES SHORT MOBILIZATION AND STATES THAT USABLE WARNINGTIME WOULD NOT BE LONGER THAN 13 DAYS EVEN WITH FULL MOBILIZATION. US FEELS THAT SURPRISE ATTACK PROVIDES NO POSSIBILITY OF POLITICAL GAIN THROUGH MILITARY PRESSURE AND RISKS IRRATIONAL RESPONSE. WARSAW PACT MORE LIKELY TO CARRY OUT FULL MOBILIZATION AND THEN USE THE MILITARY THRUST AS BASIS FOR NEGOTIATIONS. IF ALLIANCE PROVIDES ONLY IN-PLACE FORCES SUITABLE FOR MEETING THE MINIMUM WARNING THREAT IN ITS PLANNING, NATO WILL NOT HAVE CAPABILITY TO DEAL WITH PACT MOBILIZATION, AND IF ATTACK SHOULD COME MIGHT NOT EVEN BE ABLE TO FORCE PACT CONCENTRATIONS NECESSARY FOR USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. IN FINAL ANALYSIS, IS VIEW DISCOUNTS AND WOULD IMPLY DISBANDING ALL FORCES WHICH COULD NOT BE MOBILIZED AND READY WITHIN 16 DAYS OF PACT M-DAY.

2. HIGHLIGHTS OF ALLIED REACTION AND DIALOGUE FOLLOW:

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A. ITALY-ITALIAN DEFENSE ADVISOR (ADMIRAL MACCHIAVELLI) AGREED WITH US CONVENTIONAL EMPHASIS IN KEY ELEMENTS ON "RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RESOURCES AND STRATEGY" AND WITH IDEA THAT LIMITED REAL ANNUAL INCREASES IN RESOURCES PLUS A BIG PUSH IN COOPERATION COULD PRODUCE AN ADEQUATE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE. HE SAID THAT NATIONS MUST ACCEPT IDEA OF ALLIED INTERDEPENDENCE BEFORE PRODUCTIVE DISCUSSIONS ON DETAILS CAN TAKE PLACE. BOWMAN SAID US IS WILLING TO DO ITS SHARE AND DOES NOT EXPECT EUROPE TO MAKE ALL THE CONCESSIONS IN RATIONALIZATION AND STANDARDIZATION. ADMIRAL MACCHIAVELLI OBSERVED THAT IS DRAFT CONCENTRATES ON THE NECESSITY FOR USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHEREAS US DRAFT ALLOWS FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF USING NUCLEAR WEAPONS IF NECESSARY. HE SAID MAY ALLIES SOMETIMES

GAVE THE APPEARANCE OF "CHOOSING IS SIDE" BECAUSE THEY ARE MORE FAMILIAR WITH IS LANGUAGE THAN NEWER CONCEPTS EXPRESSED IN THE US PAPER ON MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE. HE SAID THE PROBLEM IS "ONE OF DIGESTION, NOT ONE OF DISAGREEMENT."

B. CANADA-CANADIAN DEFENSE ADVISOR (COLONEL SHEFFIELD) EXPRESSED STRONG AGREEMENT WITH THE US STRATEGY AND RESOURCES PAPER AND SEES NO REASON TO INTERPRET IT AS A CHANGE TO MC 14/3. HE COMPLIMENTED US ON ITS CRITIQUE OF IS DISCUSSION PAPER ON WARNING OF WAR AND STATED STRONG BELIEF THAT DPC MINISTERS WOULD NOT ACCEPT IS SHORT WAR VIEW DURING DECEMBER MEETING. REGARDING USE OF WARNING, HE CALLED IS VIEW SIMPLISTIC, STATING THAT IF MINISTERS SERIOUSLY BELIEVED WARSAW PACT WAS PREPARING FOR WAR, THEY WOULD WASTE NO TIME DOING SOMETHING ABOUT IT. THIS IS NOT REFLECTED IN NATO EXERCISES BECAUSE THEY PRODUCE LITTLE HIGH LEVEL CONCERN IN CAPITALS. COLONEL SHEFFIELD SAID HE HAS NO GUIDANCE ON THE RESOURCES KEY ELEMENT, BUT OTTAWA IS NO LONGER TOTALLY DIS- ENCHANTED WITH PERCENTAGE OF GNP AS A MEASURE OF ALLIED CONTRIBUTION.

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NSAE-00 PA-01 RSC-01 PRS-01 SP-02 USIA-06 TRSE-00

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CINCLANT

CINCUSAFE

CINCUSAREUR

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C. NORWAY-NORWEGIAN DEFENSE ADVISOR (MR. LEINE) NOTED CHANGE IN US PAPER WHICH MAKES ATTAINMENT OF A CON- VENTIONAL BALANCE CONDITIONAL ON GREATER ALLIANCE COOPERATION

AND ATTENTION TO PRIORITIES. HE ALSO ENDORSED INCREASED US EMPHASIS ON THE MUTUAL INTERDEPENDENCE OF ALL LEGS OF THE TRIAD. ON ARNING OF WAR, HE AGREED WITH US CRITIQUE OF IS DISCUSSION PAPER AND SAID CHAIRMAN HUMPHREYS HAS ATTEMPTED TO REWRITE MC-161. GENERAL BOWMAN EXPLAINED US POSITION ON IMPORTANCE OF COMBAT READY MOBILIZABLE AND REINFORCEMENT FORCES, POINTING IN PARTICULAR TO THEIR IMPORTANCE ON THE NORTHERN FLANK. LEINE STRONGLY AGREED, STATING FAMILIAR NORWEGIAN VISS THAT NORWAY MUST DEPEND ON MOBILIZATION OF ITS RESERVES AND THAT TERRAIN DIFFICULTIES WILL MAKE TIME AVAILABLE FOR SUCH MOBILIZATION. HE STATED PREFERENCE FOR LATEST US DRAFT OVER IS DRAFT ON DURATION OF HOSTILITIES, ADDING THAT HE UNDERSTANDS US CONGRESS WILL NOT BUY THE IDEA OF CONVENTIONAL FORCES FOR A TRIPWIRE RESPONSE. GENERAL  
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BOWMAN AGREED, STATING THAT US WOULD SEEK TO HOLD THE LINE WITH CONGRESS, AND A REALISTIC ALLIED VIEW ON NEED FOR CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITY WOULD HELP. LEINE RECEIVED INSTRUCTIONS TO SUPPORT THE IS DRAFT ON WARNING TIME, BUT BELIEVES THIS WAS ONLY BECAUSE THE IS DRAFT WAS NOT TOO DIFFERENT FROM MC-161. LEINE CLOSED BY STATING THAT PRESENT IS IDEAS ARE THE SAME TRIPWIRE IDEAS MR. DENNIS HEALEY EXPRESSED IN 1967, THAT THEY WERE WRONG THEN, AND ARE EVEN MORE WRONG NOW.

D. DENMARK-DANISH DEFENSE ADVISOR (MR. ROSENTHAL)  
CHARACTERIZED BOWMAN'S CONTENTION THAT NATO WOULD REQUIRE MOBILIZABLE FORCES FOR RESPONSE TO POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED WARSAW PACT MILITARY BUILD-UP AS "A VERY GOOD CASE." WHEN BOWMAN SAID US HAD MODIFIED ORIGINAL US DISCUSSION PAPER LANGUAGE TO ASSUAGE ALLIED FEARS ABOUT EXCESSIVE CONVENTIONAL EMPHASIS, ROSENTHAL RESPONDED THAT RECENT NATO DISCUSSIONS INSPRIED BY NUNN AMENDMENT HAD PRACTICAL EFFECT OF PLACING GREATER APPARENT EMPHASIS ON TACTICAL NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ROSENTHAL EXPRESSED SURPRISE THAT IS AND US DRAFTS ON WARNING TIME COULD CONFLICT WHEN BOTH ALLEGEDLY REFLECT MC 161/74. BOWMAN SAID IS EMPHASIS ON WORST CASE, SHORT WARNING SCENARIO AND US DESIRE TO CONSIDER ALL PLAUSIBLE SCENARIOS LEAD TO SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES IN CONCLUSIONS. ROSENTHAL SAID HE COULD "SEE THE PHILOSOPHY" BEHIND US DESIRE THAT NATO MAINTAIN CONVENTIONAL FORCES SUFFICIENT TO PREVENT FORCED ESCALATION TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND HE ENDORSED US CRITIQUE OF IS DISCUSSION PAPER ON WARNING OF WAR.

E. NETHERLANDS-DUTCH DEFENSE ADVISOR (MR. CARSTEN)  
SAID THAT THE WORDS "BALANCE" AND "OUTLAST" IN US DISCUSSION PAPER WERE CAUSING PROBLEMS AMONG ALLIES. BOWMAN SAID LATEST US SUBMISSIONS HAD DECREASED EMPHASIS ON THESE WORDS. CARSTEN RESPONDED THAT "THE DAMAGE HAS ALREADY BEEN DONE" SINCE US PAPER MADE ALLIES WONDER WHAT THE US IS AIMING AT. CARSTEN SAID HE PERSONALLY ASSUMES THAT US DOES NOT REPEAT NOT INTEND TO REVISE NATO STRATEGY BUT SIMPLY TO IMPROVE DETERRENCE THROUGH

BETTER CONVENTIONAL FORCES. HE ADDED, "IF YOU USE NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO SAVE EUROPE, I AM NOT SURE EUROPE WOULD BE GRATEFUL". CARSTEN ASKED WHETHER BOWMAN BELIEVES NATO CONVENTIONAL FORCES COULD STOP A LARGE SCALE WARSAW PACT CONVENTIONAL ATTACK BEFORE IT REACHED THE RUHR. BOWMAN RESPONDED THAT  
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IF NATO NATIONS MEET THEIR FORCE GOALS CALLING FOR GREATLY IMPROVED ANTI-TANK WEAPONS, ETC. AND INCREASED COOPERATION AND FLEXIBLE CONTROL, THEY SHOULD STAND A GOOD CHANCE OF BLOCKING ANY SOVIET THRUST. CARSTEN SAID HE PERSONALLY LIKES US SUBMISSION ON WARNING OF WAR BUT THAT THE HAGUE WAS GOVERNED BY ITS INTELLIGENCE EXPERTS VIEWS ON MC 161-74 POSITION. HE STATED THAT US SHOULD ATTEMPT TO CHANGE MC161/74 IF IT WANTS NETHERLANDS TO TAKE DIFFERENT POSITION ON WARNING OF WAR. BOWMAN RESPONDED THAT LTEST REVISION OF US POSITION IS NOW FULLY IN AGREEMENT WITH MC161/74. IN CONCLUDING COMMENTS, CARSTEN SAID THE HAGUE GENERALLY LIKES US PAPER BUT DOES NOT WANT TO MAKE UP ITS MIND UNTIL MISSING PARTS ARE RECEIVED. HE SAID THE HAGUE ALSO WANTS AN ASSESSMENT FROM THE NETHERLANDS MILITARY AUTHORITIES ON WARNING OF WAR, AND ADDED THAT THEY ARE ONLY NOW STARTING THIS ASSESSMENT. HE SAID HE WILL GO TO THE HAGUE ON 25 NOVEMBER TO DISCUSS DPC MINISTERIAL AGENDA AND US MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE.

F. TURKEY-TURKISH DEFENSE ADVISOR (TOPUR) AND MOD REPRESENTATIVE (BAYTUK) PARTICIPATED. BAYTUK SAID MAJOR TURKISH QUESTION IS, "DOES THE US WANT TO CHANGE NATO STRATEGY?" HE SAID US DISCUSSION PAPER INDICATES THAT NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES ARE "FROZEN IN BALANCE" AND THAT NATO MUST THEREFORE IMPROVE CONVENTIONAL FORCES. HE ASKED WHETHER THIS MEANS NATO HAS LOST ABILITY TO RESPOND FLEXIBLY. GENERAL BOWMAN SAID US DOES NOT INTEND TO CHANGE STRATEGY OR  
DE-EMPHASIZE ANY NECESSARY USE OF NUCLEAR ELEMENTS OF TRIAD. REGARDING INCREASED CONVENTIONAL FORCES FOR NATO EUROPE, BAYTUK SAID TURKEY AGREES WITH THIS OBJECTIVE, BUT TWO MAJOR PROBLEMS EXIST: POLITICAL WILL AND ECONOMIC CONSTRAINTS. HE SAID US DISCUSSION PAPER POINTS TOWARD PROGRESS IN STANDARDIZATION, RATIONALIZATION, AND FLEXIBILITY, FOR ACHIEVING IMPROVED CONVENTIONAL FORCES, BUT SAID NATO HAS AS YET ACHIEVED NO REAL PROGRESS IN THESE AREAS. BOWMAN SAID THAT WHOLE POINT OF US POSITION ON MINISTERIAL GUIDANCE WAS THAT COOPERATIVE PROGRAMS SHOULD RECEIVE HIGH LEVEL SUPPORT NECESSARY TO MAKE THEM HAPPEN. THIS WOULD REQUIRE SOME SACRIFICE IN PARTICULAR NATIONAL INTERESTS IN ORDER TO PROTECT THE MORE IMPORTANT OVERALL INTEREST IN MAINTAINING  
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ADEQUATE SECURITY. BAYTUK SAID SOUTHERN FLANK HAS PARTICULAR  
PROBLEMS WITHOUT THE RESOURCES TO SOLVE THEM, AND PROBLEM WILL  
BE WORSE IF GREEKS WITHDRAW. BOWMAN AGEEED THAT IN LATTER  
EVENT NATO WOULD HAVE TO TAKE SPECIAL MEASURES TO INSURE AN  
ADEQUATE DEFENSE IN THE SOUTHERN REGION  
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